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On December 9, 2014, United States Secretary of Health and Human Services Sylvia
Burwell issued a declaration under the US Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP)
Act to provide immunity from legal claims related to manufacturing, testing, development,
distibution, and administration of three candidate Ebola vaccines.' Atan earlermeetigofajor
stakeholders held at the World Health Organization (WHO), the management of legal liabilities
related to vaccines was an important subject of the global response to Ebola addressed by national
government, the World Bank, and others. That discussion, however, has faded as the epidemic
has been brought under control even as clinical trials for vaccine candhdates commence. This
Essay argues that planning for the management of adverse event costs associated with rapidly
developed vaccines is in fact a critical opportunity in public health emergency preparedness and
recommends six options available to governments of countries afflicted by outbreaks of infectious
disease, governments in countries where vaccines are likely to be developed major global vaccine
manufacturers, and major third-party sponsors such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the
GlobalAlliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GA VAlliance), the World Bank, and WHO.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are real and perceived liability risks of adverse events relating
to Ebola vaccines. The challenge facing partners in the Ebola response is
to allocate, whether explicitly by action or implicitly by nonaction, such
liability risks between vaccine manufacturers, supporting governments,
beneficiary governments (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone),
individuals who may experience adverse events, and populations in the
affected countries and elsewhere who will benefit from widespread
vaccination.
This challenge is compounded by the fact that such risks and
accompanying legal liabilities are difficult to project in advance, are
based upon imperfect information, and are potential precedents for
treatment of liability risks in future public health emergencies. Guinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone have histories of relatively weak judicial
systems, which increase the potential legal risks.' Even in the context of
stronger judicial systems, there is no way to effectively assess how large
liability exposure might be. Liability for GlaxoSmithKline's AS03-
adjuvanted pandemic influenza vaccines during the 2009 H1N1 episode
ran into the tens of millions of dollars if not more.' The influenza
vaccine is generally manufactured according to well-known processes
and over its life enjoys a strong safety profile. There are, by contrast,
few, if any, licensed vaccines based on current approaches to Ebola
4. United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Improving Access to Justice in Sierm
Leone, at 3 (2009) http://www.sl.undp.org/content/dam/sierraleone/docs/projectdocuments/dem
gov/undp-sle_.A2Jprodoc.pdf; Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the
Prevention of Genocide on His Mission to Guinea from 7 to 22 March 2010, at 1 (2010),
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg-missioiireport-guinea mar_201 0.pdf.
5. Nick Paul Taylor, Report: UK. Facing S100M Compensation Payout Relating to
GSKk Swine Flu Vaccine, FIERCE VACCINES (Mar. 4,2014), http://www.fiercevaccines.comstory/
report-uk-facing-I OOm-compensation-payout-relating-gsks-swine-flu-vaccine/2014-03-04.
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vaccine development. Ebola vaccines will potentially be administered to
a large population after limited development and unusual circumstances.
In most countries, a plaintiff (whether individual or governmental)
is required to prove causation between an injury and the vaccination that
preceded it. The method by which causation is established under
products liability law differs in key respects from the accepted method of
establishing causation in science and medicine. In law, there is generally
no requirement that a decision maker, typically a judge, apply a scientific
standard to the causation determination, only that some evidence exists to
support a finding of causation.
If supporting governments accept all liabilities for adverse events
attributed to Ebola vaccines, they are potentially responsible for
substantial claims that might erode their credibility when undertaking
future vaccination or access-to-medicines programs. On the other hand,
effective risk-sharing may set a useful precedent for future public health
emergencies. There is a public health preparedness value in agreeing to
compensate individuals through predefined legal or regulatory
mechanisms. In the vaccination context generally, the traditional
argument is that the public health benefits of vaccination so far outweigh
the risks that we, as a community, compensate individuals who pay the
price in experiencing adverse events. The argument is also true for
public health emergencies where rapid response to an evolving threat in
the face of imperfect information counsels toward aggressive action.
From the standpoint of vaccine manufacturers, the risks associated
with potential legal liability cannot be fully separated from other more
general business risks and opportunities:
(1) Under prevailing legal norms, product manufacturers are expected
to pay for injuries caused by their products, which in the case of
rapidly developed medicines may result in potentially substantial
liability;
(2) The perception that a firm's vaccines may be unsafe or cause injury
may threaten its reputation across multiple product lines; and
(3) Firms compete globally, and there is a strong incentive for firms to
produce the first safe and effective Ebola vaccine given the
potential market likely to be formed by governments seeking to
secure access to an Ebola vaccine as part of their health security
preparedness plans.
This Essay focuses specifically on vaccine injury, a specific type of
product liability that is likely to subject manufacturers to "litigation risk,"
i.e., the possibility that legal action will be taken because of a defendant's
2015]
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actions, inactions, products, services or other events. It outlines
preliminary options for addressing manufacturers' litigation risk for
injuries attributed to experimental Ebola vaccines.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY AND EBOLA VACCINES
"Products liability" refers to any action against a manufacturer or
seller for recovery of damages arising out of personal injury, death, or
property damage allegedly caused by a defective product. For vaccine
manufacturers, litigation risk for product liability attaches any time there
is an association between an injury suffered by a recipient and the place,
time, and specifics of the vaccine administration. These risks are
particularly relevant for manufacturers because, even if the injury is
wrongly associated with the vaccination, the manufacturer must
nevertheless incur costs in reputation, time, and money to establish the
falsity of the allegation.
Liability will depend upon the laws applied by the court hearing the
case. Key questions as to jurisdiction, choice of law, venue, and
enforceability of judgments are complex and will depend upon the facts
of particular cases. Moreover, the rapid circumstances under which
current Ebola vaccine candidates have been or are being developed have
necessarily compressed typical drug development protocols. The
window to discover adverse events will be narrower for Ebola vaccines,
raising the risk that delayed adverse events may not be revealed until a
mass vaccination campaign is already underway.
A. Real and Unknown Risks
Even vaccines that are generally regarded as safe and effective will
still typically generate adverse events among those inoculated, ranging
from (common) soreness at the injection site, to fever, discomfort, and
muscle pain, to more serious problems like seizures, severe allergic
reactions, and brain damage.6 On December 11, 2014, the Merck-
NewLink experimental Ebola vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) phase 1 trial was
temporarily suspended because four of fifty-nine participants reported
joint pain in the hands and feet, both delayed-onset and away from the
injection site.7 The candidate vaccine (cAd3-ZEBOV) developed by
6. Possible Side-Effects from Vaccines, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
7. Joanna Lyford, Ebola Clinical Trial Suspended Afler Volunteers Complain of Joint
Pains, PHARMACEUI1CAL J. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/news-and-
analysis/news/ebola-clinical-tria-suspended-after-volunteers-compain-of-joint-pains/ 200674 18.
article.
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GlaxoSmithKline and the United States National Institute for Allergy and
Infectious Disease (NIAID) showed a mild, adverse event for some
participants at a high dose.8
B. Perceived and FalselyA ttributed Risks
In many developing countries, including Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone, there have been campaigns asserting that vaccines may cause
sterility or other adverse health effects Such campaigns fuel suspicions
that firms from developed countries use people as unwitting human
subjects for research for a range of self-serving or even nefarious
objectives. There have, in fact, been instances of improper human
subject research in developing countries which influence these views.'"
For a variety of reasons beyond the scope of this Essay, there are fears
and rumors associated with vaccination campaigns and the testing of new
medical products in many communities in the developing world. Indeed,
common rumors in the three most Ebola-affected countries link the
outbreak with preexisting vaccination drives and the presence of clinical
trials in the region sponsored by pharmaceutical companies."
Establishing causation will be a key element of any action to
recover money damages in the context of Ebola vaccines. Litigation risk
is far more significant for perceived injuries or false attribution of
background events to a vaccination. The beneficiary countries suffer
from high background levels of morbidity and mortality, and
coincidental deaths and injuries associated with vaccine administration
may give rise to liability, even if objective data ultimately vindicates a
manufacturer and its product. Similarly, vaccine-related injuries may be
attributable to contamination or infection from vaccines or improperly
used syringes, a risk that increases in low resource countries without the
infrastructure to ensure proper handling, storage, distribution, and
administration from facility to recipient.
8. NIAID/GSK Experimental Ebola Vaccine Appears Safe, Prompts Immune Response,
NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH (Nov. 28, 2014), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/nov2014/niaid-28.htm.
9. James Fairchild, Melissa Leach & Mary Small, Childhood Vaccination and Society in
the Gambia: Public Engagement with Science and Delivery 4 (Inst. of Dev. Stud., Working Paper
No. 218, Jan. 2004), http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp218.pdf.
10. Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethical Review of Research Involving Human Subjects in
Nigeria: Legal and Policy Issues, 14 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 87, 88-89 (2003-2004).
11. Yoichi Shimatsu, The Ebola Outbreak Coincided with UN Vaccine Campaiins
LIBER. OBSERVER (Oct. 9, 2014), http://www.liberianobserver.com/commentaries/ebola-breakout-
coincided-un-vaccine-campaigns.
2015] 135
TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP. LA W
C Risk-Sharing Mechanisms
Product liability plays a large role in global public health emergency
responses. In 2006, the IFPMA issued a statement in the wake of a
potential H5N 1 pandemic:
[I]n some countries, existing pharmacovigilance systems may fail to detect
key signals until after the vaccines have already been administered to
hundreds or thousands or millions of people. Many of the individuals
vaccinated could develop medical conditions, by chance alone and
unrelated to the vaccine, at some point following vaccination. It is
inevitable that many will expect to be compensated. This is why [IFPMA]
call(s) for a waiver of liability for the manufacturing and use of pandemic
vaccines.12
In the 2009 HINI pandemic, manufacturers restated their concerns with
potential product liability suits. In fact, negotiations regarding
indemnification for manufacturers caused substantial delays.'3
Manufacturers have expressed similar concerns with respect to
Ebola vaccines under development." Some jurisdictions, like the United
States, have extended immunity against legal claims related to the
manufacturing, testing, development, distribution, and administration of
Ebola vaccines.'5 But even where such legal authorizations apply, they
do not generally provide immunity for a claim brought in a court outside
that country.'6 Nor, of course, does immunity provide any relief for
individuals harmed by vaccines administered as part of public health
campaigns that respond to public health emergencies.'7
Product liability, therefore, figures prominently in manufacturers'
risk assessments, and it is on product liability that we will focus our
discussion of potential mechanisms or processes that may ameliorate
12. Int'l Fed'n of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Ass'ns [IFPMA], Pandemic Influenza
Vaccines and Liability Protection for Manufacturers (May 19, 2006), http://www.ifpma.org/
fileadmin/content/Global%20Health/lnfluenza/Ref 56_IFPMAJIVS Request onLiabilityMa
y 19_2006.pdf.
13. WHO, Report of the Review Committee on the Functioning of the International
Health Regulations, (2005) in Relation to Pandemic (HINl) 2009, A64/10 (May 5, 2011),
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA64/A64_ 0-en.pdf?ua = 1.
14. Id.
15. Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act,
77 Fed. Reg. 73,314 (Dec. 10, 2014).
16. HIHS Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness
Act, supra note 1.
17. Peggy Binzer, The PREP Act: Liability Protection for Medical Countermeasure
Development, Distribution and Adminstation, 6 BIOSECURrY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE
STRATEGY, PRAC., & Sci. 1 (2008), http://www.wcsr.com/resources/pdfs/binzer_120709.pdf
(noting that PREP Act only applies in the United States).
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liability concerns if partners in the Ebola response wish to address these
matters. We note at the outset that there are at least nineteen national, no-
fault compensation regimes for adverse events attributed to vaccination,
all of which are in well-resourced jurisdictions.8 We assume for
purposes of this Essay that establishing similar regimes in target
jurisdictions will be prohibitive due to resource constraints.
Nevertheless, there are aspects of these regimes that inform our analysis
of possible risk-sharing mechanisms.
1. Liability Remains with Manufacturer
Before considering risk-sharing and reallocating mechanisms, the
global health community should assess the relationship between
indemnification and the likelihood that the absence of a risk-sharing or
reallocating mechanisms will deter or delay manufacturer participation.
Before the current outbreak, manufacturers identified the market
potential of being a first-mover on an effective Ebola vaccine. 9 Seeking
to do so makes sense for both low-income and developed country
procurement markets. GAVI has established a $300 million dollar
procurement fund for a WIO-approved Ebola vaccine."° Moreover, there
remains the possibility that manufacturers may be able to negotiate
coverage of some sort from their traditional insurers. Similarly, while
risk-shifting regimes are advantageous in minimizing the likelihood of
delay or deterrence of manufacturer participation, they also signal that a
manufacturer may lack confidence in its product and that it regards the
chances of an adverse event as significant enough to seek maximum
indemnity for such occurrences. Indeed, such broad protection could
feed into already existing suspicions that European and North American
firms are inappropriately or illegally testing their products on people in
developing countries. Partners in the global Ebola response should
assess whether mitigating or sharing liability is necessary or desirable as
a threshold matter.
18. Clare Looker & Heath Kelly, No-Fault Compensation Following Adverse Events
Attributed to Vaccination: A Review of International Programmes 89 BULL. OF THE WHO 317,
317 (Mar. 21, 2011), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/5/10-08190 l/en/.
19. MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE: CREATING
INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES 38 (2004) (describing
first-mover advantage in vaccine markets and circumstances under which that advantage will help
innovators).
20. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization [GAVI], GAVI Commits to
Purchasing Ebola Vaccine forAffected Countries (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.gavi.org/Library/
News/Press-releases/2014/Gavi-commits-to-purchasing-ebola-vaccine-for-affected-countries/.
2015] 137
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2. Risk Sharing Between Beneficiary Governments and
Manufacturers
If conventional insurance markets are not available or optimal for
covering Ebola vaccine injury liabilities, manufacturers and procuring
governments may enter into their own variations on existing insurance
compensation schedules in place for pharmaceutical or other product
sectors. For example, manufacturers could agree to pay up to a per claim
limit as well as an aggregate limit for claims in a given jurisdiction with
the beneficiary government (potentially supported by a multilateral
agency or group of supporting governments) promising to pay any
compensation above the designated individual or aggregate claims.
Similarly, beneficiary governments may establish specific criteria
(consistent with their constitutional principles) for which burden sharing
is appropriate. For example, manufacturers may agree to compensate for
"severe" injuries, injuries based on a period or level of disability, medical
costs only, or perhaps other noneconomic losses.2 ' Some relevant models
for this kind of risk sharing may be found in UNICEF procurement
agreements which, depending on vaccine and registration, shift liabilities
between the manufacturer and the beneficiary government." UNICEF
and third-party financing entities are generally fully indemnified. 3 A
second set of relevant models may be found in multilateral agreements
addressing indemnification for national security or emergency vaccine
deployments like smallpox.'
3. Multilateral Agency or Supporting Government Approach
The World Bank, or a group of willing, supporting governments,
may agree to cover any liabilities arising from vaccine injuries. Aside
from the logistical questions that will confront a multilateral agency or
supporting governments as to how claims are established, how losses and
compensation are calculated, and what administrative body will be
charged with undertaking those determinations, this approach requires
either that manufacturers defend themselves initially and then seek
21. Looker & Kelly, supra note 18.
22. United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF], Request for Proposal: United Nations
Children ' Fund (UNICEF) Wishes To Receive Proposals for Inactivated Polio Vaccine (IPV),
RFP-DAN-2013-501729 (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.unicef.org/videoaudio/PDFs/RFPDAN_
2013_501729.pdf.
23. WHO, Operational Framework for Monovalent Oral Poliovirus Type 2 (mOPV2)
Deployment and Replenishment (Dun'g the Endgame Period), arts. 15-16 (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://www.who.intiimmunization/sage/meetings/2014/october/4-Polio-mOPV2-stockpile-v4_0
9_10_2014.pdf.
24. See, e.g., id
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reimbursement or that the supporting organization or group be
substituted as the proper party as a threshold matter in any legal action.
4. Risk Mitigation Through Disclosure and Government
Recommendations to Judicial Authorities
The principal litigation risk manufacturers face is the possibility of
an individual or governmental party bringing suit against it for one of the
aforementioned legal bases of liability in a judicial system with which
the manufacturer is unfamiliar and/or whose processes may not be as
transparent or well-resourced as in its home jurisdiction. This risk may
be mitigated if manufacturers are given clear bases for liability in a given
jurisdiction and are promised by beneficiary governments to appear in
judicial proceedings to explain the reasons for deployment of vaccines.
By lending a promise to participate in judicial processes, beneficiary
governments may give manufacturers at least some assurance (indeed,
relatively low cost assurance) that the beneficiary government will
appear to explain legal positions. In the GAVI context, this may be
encouraged by including ministries of justice (as well as ministries of
health and finance) in country procurement plans or clarifying the ability
of ministries of health and finance to appear in court to articulate
government positions in specific cases. This has the additional benefit of
allowing governmental legal experts the opportunity to present and shape
epidemiological and medical evidence as courts and other tribunals are
accustomed to hearing it.
5. Declarations of Immunity by Supporting and Beneficiary
Governments
Taking as a model the U.S. declaration of immunity, under U.S. law
for legal claims related to the manufacturing, testing, development,
distribution, and administration of specified vaccines for the Ebola virus,
allow beneficiary governments and supporting governments issue similar
declarations pursuant to whichever statutory and regulatory frameworks
might serve as bases to circumscribe, limit, or prohibit litigation based on
Ebola vaccine injury. 5 This option is complex, not only because of the
internal constitutional and statutory process that may need to mobilize in
support of such a declaration, but because judicial or administrative
authorities in jurisdictions which lack clear authority for such
declarations may deem those acts void under law. Externally (and
25. Notice of Declaration Under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act,
79 Fed. Reg. 73,314 (Dec. 10, 2014).
2015] 139
TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP LA W
relatedly) if beneficiary and supporting governments do not issue
relatively uniform declarations in relatively similar timeframes, it may
open additional areas of legal uncertainty.
6. Contractual Indemnities Provided by Third-Party Procurement
Entities or Supporting Governments
It is also possible to construct a regime that is entirely or almost
entirely risk shifting from manufacturers to procuring governments or to
third parties through the procurement agreements themselves. This was
effectively the approach adopted for donations and discounted sales of
vaccines by manufacturers during the 2009-2010 HINI pandemic as
well as fully commercial sales to high-income countries. 26 Manufacturers
agreed to produce vaccines under the condition that all supporting
governments indemnify them from liability "for any adverse events
arising from the use of pandemic HIN1 vaccine, except to the extent that
such adverse events were caused by a failure to comply with cGMP or to
meet agreed specifications., 27  This would effectively expand current
measures by some governments, like the United States, to shield
manufacturers from liability and to effectively cover similar judgments
arising in other jurisdictions. As a practical matter, this may end up in
negotiated agreements with beneficiary governments where a lump
payment is paid to discharge all claims for individuals a beneficiary
government represents.28 This arrangement is supported by a long set of
international legal precedent.
As the aforementioned discussion noted, such comprehensive
promises of indemnification may be both expensive for supporting
governments and erode their credibility in attempting to undertake other
public health support or emergency measures in the future. Additionally,
26. Sam F. Halabi, Obstacles to pHIN1 Vaccine Availability The Complex Contracting
Relationship Between Vaccine Manufacturers, WHO, Donor and Beneficiary Governments, THE
PuB. HEALTH RESPONSE To 2009 HINI (2015), http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article= 1469&context=facpub.
27. WHO, Report of the WHO Pandemic Influenza A (HINI) Vaccine Deployment
Initiative, at 9 (2009), http://www.who.int/influenza vaccines-plan/resources/h I n ldeployment-
report.pdf.
28. Letter from Maxim Litvinov to the President of the United States of America (Nov.
16, 1933), http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/coldwar/documents/episodes-l/fdr-ml.htm; Declaration of
the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Relating to the Commitments
made by Iran and the United States, 20 I.L.M. 223, 1 (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 1981); Declaration of the
Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
20 I.L.M. 223, 9 (Iran-U.S. CI. Trib. 1981).
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a preexisting promise of indemnity may increase meritless claims as well
as reduce the optimal risk manufacturers should bear.
III. CONCLUSION
There are legal risks involved with the current vaccine development
effort that is now under way that need to be managed by the relevant
actors in the response to the Ebola outbreak in the beneficiary countries.
The lack of a global plan for legal risk means a solution must be cobbled
together at each step in the response when it is precisely the kind of
predictable, resolvable issue that lends itself to advance planning. Doing
so provides an opportunity for the global community to use the current
Ebola vaccine development and distribution effort as a precedent for
dealing with related issues in future global emergencies.

